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T‘Though we may not be allowed to mention it in public, we have to mention the r-word because there is now a significant probability of recession.’ 2The quoted sentence was said at the Fed’s 
crisis management committee meeting in Sep-
tember 2008. They didn’t know, but strongly 
suspected that a crisis would come. ten years 
after the crisis, this sentence could be uttered 
today, even though circumstances are current-
ly much better.
Ernest Hemingway’s lyrical hero’s telling an-
swer to the question of how things went wrong 
was dramatically simple: gradually, then sud-
denly. This is what happened at the time of 
the 1929–1933 crisis to droves of big banks 
and businesses. A similar process played out 
in the American financial markets followed by 
the leading financial markets of the world be-
tween 2007 and 2008, when storied banking 
houses again found themselves on the brink of 
bankruptcy. At first, it was just an increasing 
accumulation of tension, beginning with the 
American mortgage market, then other lead-
ing capital and financial markets of the world 
followed suit. Then the amount of unsold or 
foreclosed real estate in the uSA increased and 
a growing number of smaller banks and credit 
institutions went bankrupt. The big quake 
came in September of 2008, when Lehman 
Brothers collapsed, kicking off the crisis. The 
insolvency of the Lehman banking house kick-
started a series of panic sell-offs on American 
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stock markets and became the beginning of a 
lasting, global economic recession. The conse-
quences of the deepening financial crisis be-
came increasingly serious both in the uSA and 
in europe, then slightly later in the Far east. 
A little more than a decade has passed since 
these dramatic events unfolded. Following the 
tenth anniversary of the global economic cri-
sis, it may be worthwhile to take a retrospec-
tive look at the main string of events and espe-
cially at whether the management of the crisis 
can be said to have been fundamentally correct 
or not, whether the crisis management goals 
were correct and, of course, the tools used. it is 
even more important to examine whether the 
risks that arose a decade ago can arise again or 
if we can rest assured that there is no threat 
of a similarly large-scale shock of this type. 
Can we be confident that the new systems of 
assurances, special checks and modern fore-
casting mechanisms implemented on interna-
tional financial markets can allow us to detect 
looming dangers far earlier and act on time? 
These are difficult questions that – we must set 
things straight right off the bat – economics 
and specifically the more restricted circle of in-
ternational finance specialists can provide no 
clear and generally reassuring answers to for 
either politicians or investors. This seemingly 
pessimistic observation is understood easier if 
we also point out that the views assessing the 
2008–2009 financial crisis and providing per-
spective on the subject of those responsible and 
of crisis management measures taken cover a 
fairly wide range to this day and even as the 
past ten years have passed, the various stances 
taken by different representatives of econom-
ics continue to be characterized by disagree-
ments that are strongly contradictory, albeit 
significant in terms of followers.3 The leading 
english-language trade magazine of the Hun-
garian Academy of Sciences devoted a special 
issue to studies taking a retrospective look at 
the crisis.4 This volume also reinforces the fact 
that authoritative views continue to cover a 
wide range. Both new and old critiques ana-
lyzing Keynesianism (tanzi, 2018) along with 
debates analyzing the role of financial markets 
and banks have not reached a resting point 
(Kotlikoff, 2018). But deeper, global economic 
and social effects can also not be given a clear 
interpretation (török, Konka, 2018).
The crisis itself also became a force shaping 
society and politics. What’s more, the drama 
of the financial crisis graduated to the noble 
position of a ‘public good of world literature’, 
providing a great topic for media and Holly-
wood producers alike.5 Monumental scholarly 
works were also born, such as english histo-
rian Adam Tooze’s monography that offers a 
thorough and deep analysis of the dramatic 
events of 2008, in his new book released in the 
summer of 2018. The historian, known for his 
previous works on the events of the interwar 
period, brings to life the series of events of the 
world economic crisis in a heavy volume. in 
the very first part of the book, he shrewdly 
points out successful crisis management meas-
ures, the fact that a very strong financial eas-
ing represented the main response of central 
bank policies properly performing ‘lender of 
last resort’ functions. tooze is also correct in 
pointing out that these lastingly eased mon-
etary conditions were also coupled with fiscal, 
i.e. central budgetary stimulation, meaning 
that there was significant mitigation on the 
government expenditure side. This means that 
crisis management had to be based on easing 
on both sides of the intervention controlled 
by the state. 
The evaluation of these easing measures 
from the standpoint of the strength and signif-
icance of economic intervention is important, 
because it has once again become obvious that 
the self-regulatory ability of the economy is 
insufficient. The last resort was a quick reac-
tion by the bank of issue, and it was only by 
‘creating’ new money and by then ‘pumping it’ 
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could the – almost full – loss of confidence in 
the suddenly frozen demand side be stopped 
along with a larger-scale and long-lasting bank-
ing panic mimicking the years 1929–33. After 
the fact, it is clear and it is a very important 
lesson that in the developed world, by default, 
it was not restrictive budgetary measures, but 
rather easing measures that represented the 
most successful escape route [for more details, 
see Magas (2016)]. to wit, this combined 
easing guaranteed that a lasting low-demand 
state in most developed countries didn’t turn 
into a long-lasting, serious state of recession. 
As such, ex post facto confirmation of the eas-
ing measures according to mainstream mac-
roeconomics can be deemed correct insofar as 
they showed anticyclical characteristics.6 As a 
result, this traditional view, which had already 
worked earlier, did not need to be reinter-
preted by economists and the old anticycli-
cal recipe could once again take center stage, 
favoring saving in the budget in the run-up 
period, i.e. spending less; and taking opposing 
measures in the low-demand period, increas-
ing government spending, even at the cost of 
creating significant new debt. in the Anglo-
Saxon tradition, there is a saying that goes 
‘you need to fix the roof when the sun is shin-
ing’. in the language of budgetary policy, this 
translates to the government spending more 
in times of crisis and saving to create reserves 
in prosperous periods, when the economy is 
‘running high’. An ex post facto approval of 
anticyclical state intervention is, of course, 
not equivalent to stating that all government 
measures were right. The lack of specific legal 
facts that could have been ascertained was vis-
ible in the sanctions meted out, many escaped 
punishment. However, it is now possible to 
determine with fairly high accuracy which big 
bank represented a so-called systemic risk at 
the time of the crisis, i.e. whose bailing-out 
could have appeared as justified in order to 
protect the entire banking system. Therefore, 
when we speak of macroprudential measures 
and bailouts – i.e. those that serve the safety 
of the entire system – we must always think of 
effectively large financial institutions (e.g. Wa-
chovia, AiG, Bear Stearns). The government 
program, tARP (troubled Asset Relief Pro-
gram), which temporarily took control of the 
assets of troubled financial companies worked 
well as a stabilizer, using a tolerable amount of 
taxpayer money.
Financial supervisory authorities also awoke 
late in the european union, in 2009, large 
european banks needed to be recapitalized 
and not in the manner that had been usual up 
to that point, but with freshly created Ameri-
can funding by the Fed: deutsche Bank and 
BNP Paribas, for instance, had a significant 
level of exposure on the American mortgage 
market. Later, this was compounded by the 
‘internally originated’ financial crisis within 
the eurozone that was the shakeup – and par-
tial collapse – of the cheap euro loans Greece, 
ireland, italy and to a lesser extent Portugal 
and Spain had taken out – in part to cover 
public debt. in 2011–2012, in the eurozone, 
it was the tax payers of net contributor coun-
tries who had to dig deep into their pockets 
to balloon the so-called special stability funds 
and make gigantic loans by the iMF, eCB and 
the european Commission available again, 
mainly to settle the Greek financial situation. 
But this is also a crisis of the past, by August 
2018, Greece had straightened its affairs out 
to such an extent that it was able to appear on 
the private credit market, i.e. access funding 
on the international bond markets. 
CriSiS mEASUrES in ThE USA – 
lookinG bACk
‘Of course, we knew how difficult it is for 
economists to peer into the future. Dave Stockton, 
a fine forecaster of long experience, with an equally 
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fine—and dark—sense of humor, reminded us 
what a messy business it was.’ – former chair of 
the Fed Ben Bernanke said in his recollections 
on the pages of his book about the difficult 
months of crisis management.7 
‘I thought I would invite you to don your hair 
nets and white butcher smocks and join me for a 
tour of the sausage factory.’8 This is the sentence 
david Stockton kicked off the crisis manage-
ment researcher’s extraordinary meeting with, 
organized to put Fed leadership on notice. He 
intended to draw attention to the fact that re-
searchers and decision-makers were stumbling 
around in the dark despite predictability and 
the expanded possibilities of modeling (dCGe, 
i.e. dynamic Computable General equilibri-
um). This fact became even more obvious when 
it came to less developed countries.9
today, it is entirely clear to us and, reading 
Bernanke’s recollections, we can believe that 
even the most state-of-the-art models describ-
ing the functioning of the economy could not 
have taken into account the duration and ex-
tent of the effects developing in the wake of the 
financial markets’ loss of stability. One reason 
for this is that financial crises – on such a de-
structive scale – rarely present and, what’s more, 
they always differ in nature. This is how it came 
to be that in 2007, in these difficult hours, the 
Fed’s crisis analysis team had to look to other 
countries’ example, namely that of Sweden and 
Japan, for the experts of the Fed to be able 
to provide a semblance of an estimation as to 
the extent of the effects they could expect. ear-
lier, following the financial turbulence arising 
in the wake of the 1998 events in Russia, the 
Fed’s team of analysts had significantly under-
estimated the uSA’s growth forecasts, because 
it had believed that the effects of the Russian 
and Asian financial crisis would have a signifi-
cant impact on the performance of the Ameri-
can economy. However, they were fundamen-
tally wrong in their estimations in that case. ‘I 
think it’s fair to say that part of our mistake in 
1998 was a failure to appreciate just how strong 
the U.S. economy was when we entered that pe-
riod.’10 – d. Stockton himself said, illustrating 
the toughness of the matter.
The lessons drawn from this mistake caused 
some level of optimism: in the Fall of 2007, 
labor market data was slightly improving, 
converging downwards, unemployment num-
bers were at 4.6 per cent. Since troubling signs 
seemingly manifested themselves on the mort-
gage markets instead of the bond and stock 
markets, like a decade previous, initially, Fed 
analysts didn’t see much reason to be alarmed 
and neither did the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC). Some were more cau-
tious in their wording regarding the looming 
difficulties, such as Richard Mishkin, who also 
warned the Committee behind closed doors 
– in Bernanke’s recollection of the situation, 
Mishkin’s remark was sharp and appeared to 
signal danger: ‘Though we may not be allowed 
to mention it in public, we have to mention the 
r-word because there is now a significant prob-
ability of recession.’11 The r-word mentioned in 
the quote is – naturally – recession (referring 
to a drop in economic growth, a downturn).
if, as a subjective, yet important, but non-
exclusive measure of the success of crisis 
management in terms of judging the current 
economic situation and its future chances, we 
want take a look at how a typical American 
consumer on an average income perceived the 
effects the fluctuations of the economy had on 
them, we can readily rely on the painstakingly 
edited and well-maintained consumer confi-
dence index by the university of Michigan, 
which also enjoys popularity with Fed re-
searchers. it is the evolution of this indicator 
that is shown in Figure 1, which, as such, re-
cords a certain confidence index over the past 
nearly four decades.
Figure 1 clearly shows that the measured 
data set of consumer confidence rarely reached 
the ‘golden age’ base level of the mid-1960s: it 
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did so in the first period of R. Reagan’s presi-
dency and later, during the years of elation 
of the stock market soar of dot.com compa-
nies between 1995 and 2000, and for a short 
period during the critical 2004 election year, 
fraught with acts of war; following this, the in-
dicator was only able to approach the base lev-
el. The evolution of consumer confidence was 
characterized by a strange unpredictability: in 
the figure, it took on an ‘irregular’ shape in the 
cycles between the grey columns, i.e. in the in-
dividual recession and recovery periods, whose 
length varied to begin with, making it difficult 
to forecast business cycles in the first place. 
in the four decades observed, in the recovery 
periods following downturns, the confidence 
scale of consumers was characterized by differ-
ent trends each time: at the end of the 70s, 
it went down; following 1980, there is some 
increase, then until 1988, there is a ‘pleasant 
stagnation’ between 90 and 100; globaliza-
tion, the it revolution and the dot.com wave 
brought with it a positive trend, a clear upward 
trend in consumers’ ‘vision of confidence’. The 
exact opposite happened in the 2000s. Follow-
ing the 2008 crisis, starting from a trough, the 
confidence index was trending upwards again, 
drawing close to 100 by the time of Trump’s 
presidency. The average of the four decades is a 
confidence index level of roughly 80. Based on 
this, we can hardly speak of a recipe that has 
clearly worked in enabling and maintaining re-
covery – at least if we look at the ‘all powerful’ 
consumer index perception.
Longer-term prediction of confidence indi-
ces is particularly difficult, the scholarly foun-
Figure 1
Consumer ConfidenCe index of the university of miChigan (usa), 1980–2018  
(1966 Q1 = 100)
Note: The columns with a grey shade show recession quarters
Source: Univ. of michigan, Federal reserve Economic reserach, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/ 
recession quarters
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dation of strict and enduring parametric ap-
proaches is still fairly primitive even in the view 
of the world’s most developed (Fed) research 
apparatuses. What’s also food for thought is 
that the American growth and factor income 
statistics of the past 30 years have also been 
characterized by a milder, albeit multifactor de-
gree of uncertainty in terms of measurements 
and thereby prediction. The following section 
is devoted to briefly presenting these statistics.
if we examine the three-decade period go-
ing from 1987 to 2018 from the point of 
view of the dynamics characterizing economic 
growth and productivity, we can make the fol-
lowing assertions based on Figure 2.
The periods between 1987 and 1990, and 
1990 and 1991 were characterized by signifi-
cant economic growth with an annual average 
of 3.2 and 2.9 per cent respectively. in the pe-
riod between 1995 and 2000, the economy 
kicked into high gear and labor productivity 
also reached record levels. in the period be-
tween 2000 and 2007, a very significant drop 
occurred in the average annual dynamics of 
both variables and between 2007 and 2018, 
the convalescent period was characterized by 
no more than 1.8 per cent of growth per an-
num. it is true that this average was dramati-
cally decreased by the 2008–2009 crisis, where 
a drop of –0.5 and –4 per cent, i.e. significant 
loss of output, occurred. it is apparent that af-
ter 2001, both labor productivity’s and full fac-
tor productivity’s growth levels had lost much 
of the momentum that had characterized them 
in decades previous and a larger MFP pull cre-
ating the foundation of a long-term annual 
growth of 3 per cent still seems evasive. The 
CBO (Congressional Budget Office) estimated 
Figure 2
output, labor and full faCtor produCtivity in the ameriCan eConomy 1987–2018 
(annual Change as a perCentage)
Source: own edited based on the bureau of labor Statistics, blS, march 2018
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that reversing the negative output aspects of 
unfavorable demographic processes would re-
quire an annual MFP growth of at least 2.3 per 
cent in the long run for an average of at least 
10 years (by the way, the CBO predicts 3.3 
per cent of GdP growth for 2018 and 2.4 per 
cent for 2019).12 However, it will be very dif-
ficult to achieve this goal, as there hasn’t been 
a single 10-year period in the uSA’s economy 
since 1949 where this MFP average was met. 
Furthermore, it is remarkable that in the entire 
OeCd group of countries, a general slowdown 
of productivity has become typical: in the peri-
od between 2005 and 2018, the output growth 
per hour worked was 0.9 per cent, while in the 
uSA, it was 1 per cent. Therefore, we can hard-
ly hope that this difference should grow last-
ingly and to a larger extent in the uSA’s favor 
even as far as 5 to 10 years down the line. 
if we consider the little over two decades 
between 1995 and 2018 a single period, the 
trend is a marked decrease in growth. The rea-
sons for the decrease are manifold, the most 
important one being the slowdown of labor 
productivity and the particularly unfavora-
ble development of demographic factors. The 
missing output growth can primarily be at-
tributed to these two factors, which, by the 
way, has been the basic presumption of the 
neoclassical growth model for the past nearly 
half century. in this sense, then, there is noth-
ing new under the sun when it comes to the 
‘variability’ of American economic growth 
processes, which is confirmed, among others, 
by Dismuke (2015). 
ThE bUSinESS CyClE FolloWinG  
ThE CriSiS in ThE EU
The management of the 2010–11 financial 
crisis – although, it is true, with some delay – 
also qualifies, on the whole, as a success in the 
european union.
in the eurozone as well, the business cy-
cle that has brought with it an acceptable 
amount of lasting growth and which many 
have already treated as dead and buried has 
now entered its fifth year (although, it is true, 
signs of a slowdown appeared at the end of 
2018). While in the group of countries that 
use the euro as their currency, the extent of 
the growth is expected to decrease to some 
degree in the two to three years ahead, most 
forecasts remain hopeful, because the world 
economy seems to be able to maintain an eco-
nomic cycle that is longer compared to pre-
vious ones, but still good. While a relatively 
relaxed monetary environment will also con-
tinue for a while, we can already see a stricter 
credit supply structure operating with interest 
rates slowly increased by commercial banks. 
investors are now encountering more expen-
sive, longer-term loans, which have more of a 
cool-down rather than a warm-up effect when 
it comes to the european and global business 
cycle’s expected temperature. A normal inter-
est environment will eventually return, that 
is, central bank interest rates and the banking 
system will seek to provide positive effective 
interests to savers.
in the eurozone, economic growth is ex-
pected to reach 2.2 per cent in 2018 and 1.9 
to 2.1 per cent in 2019. This is the forecast 
provided by the October 2018 issue of the 
OeCd’s World economic Outlook, which 
can be considered official.13 Such a growth rate 
in the eu, in comparison with previous world 
economic crisis situations, appears encourag-
ing. What is most reassuring is that – with the 
exception of France and Spain – long-term 
youth unemployment indices have also im-
proved, which at the time of the 2010–2013 
eurozone crisis were at critically high levels. 
These numbers were more favorable in the fall 
of 2018, dropping to about a third of the level 
of the crisis years. As such, the economic situ-
ation of the eurozone in the second half of 
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2018 appears favorable, although some slow-
down is likely. The overall picture also quali-
fies as good, at least compared to the predic-
tions that came out during the 2011–2013 
eurozone crisis, outlining a collapse and a 
disaster. Furthermore, another positive aspect 
is that despite Brexit remaining unresolved 
for want of an approval by parliament in spite 
of an official eu-uK agreement and despite 
the uncertainties of the features of a poten-
tial european fiscal union, the euro’s value has 
reached its much stronger pre-crisis levels, at 
least when paired with the uS dollar and the 
British pound. An encouraging development 
is that the eurozone’s weakest link, Greece – 
it would appear – has been able to return on 
the private market to channels of public debt 
financing hitherto closed to it, after the iMF, 
the european Central Bank and the european 
Commission (the troika) declared the pro-
spective condition of Greece’s public financ-
es ‘healed’. The most severe, large-scale debt 
relief measures predicted by international fi-
nancial markets did not take place, nor did 
a significant write-off of Greece’s public debt 
(amounting to over 180 per cent of the GdP 
currently), only some easing with extended 
deadlines and a reduction of interest burdens. 
While this is decidedly a positive outcome, it 
is likely not a final, i.e. sustainably manage-
able state of affairs.
if we count the overall performance of 
national economies in the last normal year 
preceding the world economic crisis, 2007, 
as 100, the eurozone, by the end of October 
2018, surpassed the pre-crisis level by 8 per 
cent, reaching 108. Within the zone, Ger-
many reached 114 per cent, France 109 and 
Spain 105. Of course, the average was strongly 
decreased by consistently ‘ailing’ countries like 
italy, which still only reached 96 per cent by 
the end of 2018, meaning a loss of 4 per cent 
compared to its performance in 2007 and 
Greece, which, trending downwards, was only 
able to ‘stop’ at 76 per cent, meaning a loss of 
nearly one quarter of its pre-crisis GdP. 
Overall, it can be said that the eurozone 
performed well by its own standards follow-
ing the crisis. At the same time, the statistics 
advise caution, telling us that investment in 
physical capital in the eurozone has still not 
been able to recover to the level recorded in 
the last ‘normal’ year preceding the crisis! This 
indicator – presumably – will only catch up 
‘with itself ’ in 2019, i.e. reach its 2007 level. 
The significant lagging behind and the invest-
ment deficit is best explained by the fact that 
in the wake of so-called quantitative easing – 
the eCB pumping ‘oxygen’ into the european 
economy’s bloodstream using freshly created 
money via its continuous acquisition of gov-
ernment bonds and secondary bond market 
acquisitions – the new funds went mostly to-
wards acquiring other securities. This meant 
that these funds rarely launched specifically 
new, greenfield investment projects or other 
investments that effectively created jobs. From 
an economic perspective, while quantitative 
easing helped maintain economic processes, 
when the lenders change, but the loans remain 
the same or even expand, the situation can 
barely improve, the output gap (the difference 
between potential and effective output) barely 
grows narrower. in the most recent investment 
cycle following the crisis, a series of quanti-
tative easing measures in the eurozone were 
unable to achieve any real breakthrough. Year 
to year, most states are considered net issuers 
of debt, because they cannot collect enough 
tax revenue to cover the needs of the spending 
required by the public finances, therefore, the 
traditional crowding out effect also prevails 
on the eurozone’s credit market. This is one 
of the reasons why no real investment boom, 
i.e. not limited to asset markets, creating value 
and jobs, has been able to unfold in the eu-
rozone. Beyond crowding out, the causes and 
explanations of a real investment situation 
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that remains unfavorable remain numerous, 
which the present analysis cannot accommo-
date. An excellent overview of the matter is 
provided by Farkas (2018), presenting leading 
european models of capitalism. One thing is 
certain: a sustainable return to the ‘normal 
state’ of the economy cannot be delayed in 
the eurozone either. What’s more, the state 
of quantitative easing cannot be made sus-
tainable or ‘infinite’, because in such an en-
vironment, all of the most important actors 
(households, enterprises, the banking system 
and even the government) prefer to ‘wait out’ 
instead of weaving long-term, highly capital-
intensive plans. defining actors have yet to 
invest energy, money and working capital in 
long-term projects with long-term returns. 
Therefore – sadly – we cannot yet see the out-
lines of general business growth and an invest-
ment boom based in sustainable confidence.14
ThE STATE oF ThE World EConomy  
AT ThE End oF 2018
In light of  theories
For macroeconomists, the fact that there is – 
like before and after 2007, including today – 
widespread debate about the macroeconomic 
situational picture considered correct and 
the desirable direction of economic policy 
measures in the developed world certainly 
gives food for thought.15 to this day, major 
schools of thoughts in economics disagree 
on these important issues. There still remain 
many people on categorically opposite sides 
of the argument when it comes to state 
intervention, the extent of central bank 
policies, their direction, the lack thereof and 
especially desirable selectivity. Many think that 
there is no obstacle to the funding of further 
continuous government deficits.16 According 
to others – [iMF, (2015), Blanchard, Summers, 
(2017)] – the current debt levels cannot 
be increased any further without creating 
further tension. Views on how sustainable 
quantitative easing (Qe) by central banks is 
also remain similarly divided.17 The point of 
this easing is to keep pumping fresh money 
into the capital and financial markets by 
continuously acquiring securities, under the 
pretense that at least on the lending side, there 
is no limit to the emergence of productive 
investments, thereby maintaining the level 
of economic activity. According to yet others 
(Summers, 2016), precocious tightening of 
financial policies can throttle a longer-term 
blossoming of the business cycle that has 
emerged and the sustainable maintenance of 
a good or mid-level potential output level. 
The uSA started raising its interest rates as 
early as the winter of 2017, the Fed, which 
acts as the central bank, kept increasing the 
deposit and lending interest rates (by another 
25 basis points in december 2018, bringing 
the reference rate up to 2.2 per cent). The 
european Central Bank – with a four to six-
month delay compared to the uSA – is doing 
the same. By the middle of december 2018, 
it had started gradually rescinding Qe, i.e. its 
acquisitions of financial assets enacted as part 
of quantitative easing, thereby reducing the 
rate of outflow of the liquidity surplus. These 
restrictive measures have already impacted 
the eurozone’s banking systems, with banks’ 
retail and investment loans starting to become 
more expensive. Thus, the uSA and europe 
are heading in the same direction, albeit at 
slightly different paces, in a slow, but clear se-
ries of tightening measures of monetary policy 
that started a year ago now. At the same time, 
the kind of crisis easing that has been applied 
by the central bank for five years now and that 
has been characterized by quantitative easing 
will most likely cease by the middle of 2019. 
The good news is that inflation is starting to 
return to a level (2.5 to 3 per cent) which in 
 StudieS 
102  Public Finance Quarterly  2019/1
the NAiRu18 interpretation is still favorable 
to maintaining a positive economic context 
and is desirable from the point of view of 
monetary regulation. This level can still be 
controlled if fiscal and monetary measures are 
harmonized, i.e. there isn’t a series of mutually 
counterproductive measures developing. This 
moderate degree of price increase is such that 
it helps those tools of economic policy that can 
best promote the economy and employment. 
The area of economic process management 
that relates to handling and influencing busi-
ness cycles seems to be returning to its ‘normal’ 
pre-2008 state, which is decidedly a welcome 
development.
However, when seeing the theoretical, sta-
tistical and forecasting uncertainties, one may 
ask whether we can say, ten years after the fi-
nancial crisis began, that the processes of the 
economy in general – and of capital and fi-
nancial markets in particular – have returned 
to normalcy, that government institutions of 
regulation and control as well as confidence 
in these have returned to desirable levels? Or 
is it still possible for confidence to be lost to 
such an extent that it could lead to another 
economic cliff and the emergence of a fi-
nancial crisis? We cannot affirm the advent 
of ‘shockproof ’ normalization with full cer-
tainty, i.e. we can hardly speak of a return to 
order that cannot be undone in any and all 
regards. Banking systems – both in the uSA 
and on the european continent – are doing 
better again, capital adequacy ratios are good 
again and abundant funds are still available to 
leading banks in the wake of Qe (quantitative 
easing). What’s more, in the uSA, the stock 
market value of banks has returned to pre-cri-
sis levels and in europe only italy is ailing. Big 
banks have changed their investment policies 
and are now tying their premiums to a much 
larger extent to long-term achievements. 
However, the latter (premiums) are still ex-
tremely high: for instance, in 2017–2018, in 
an average-capital investment bank, the bonus 
was around 184,000 dollars per year, which is 
more than double the average American sal-
ary. However, all dangers have not dissipated: 
supervisory criticism of the way banking sys-
tems operate – such as secret price agreement, 
price fixing limiting competition, money 
laundering and mis-selling – sadly all contin-
ue to be frequently uncovered as undesirable 
practices identified by regulatory bodies. The 
situation is also somewhat deceiving, since if 
we only look at normalization developments 
and the renewed confidence in bank stocks, 
it might appear that someone who went to 
sleep in 2006 and woke up today could prac-
tically think that nothing has changed since 
they dozed off. With some exaggeration, 
there are no specific signs of the shock and 
of a larger crisis at the end of 2018 and no 
new collapse appears to be on the horizon. 
But caution is warranted: december 2018 
didn’t bring a Santa Claus rally, it brought a 
significant downward correction. if we look 
at leading American stock markets, including 
dOW JONeS and NASdAQ along with the 
defining indices of the S&P 500, we see that 
these are 8 to 12 per cent behind their pre-
crisis peaks! in developed financial markets, 
from a historic perspective, reference interest 
rates remain quite low (0.5 to 2.25 per cent). 
in the case of good debtors, the price of tak-
ing out loans is still fairly favorable both to 
households and to enterprises. 
in the most developed half of the world, 
governments can sell fresh debt fairly cheap-
ly with low yields on issue and take on new 
loans (the uSA, Canada and Germany have 
been able to sell 10-year bonds in the 3.5 to 
0.5 interval) in december 2018 even though 
the debt levels of the world economy haven’t 
significantly decreased. The global bundled 
gross debt level was equivalent to 272 per cent 
of, or almost three times, the world GdP in 
2017. This remains sobering, as a latent dan-
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ger. The largest sovereign debtors of the world 
economy (the uSA, Japan, France, Canada, 
China, italy, Spain, india and Mexico) were 
all able to refinance their expiring debts with 
fairly good interest and mark-up conditions. 
As a result, there appears to be no significant 
threat of them not being able to finance their 
budgetary deficits again and again. even Rus-
sia and turkey, which used to struggle with se-
rious international payment difficulties, man-
aged to sell 10-year foreign currency bonds in 
the Fall of 2018, with an 8.13 per cent yield in 
Russia’s case, and with what is in the context 
of today’s low interest and yield environment a 
brutally high, nearly 18 per cent yield in tur-
key’s case. to protect the turkish lira, short-
term interest rates were raised to 24 per cent! 
There are no signs of a debt crisis in the world 
economy at the end of 2018. Of course, this 
does not mean that the threat of a debt cri-
sis has completely disappeared, it just means 
that no specific hotspot or potentially global 
source of tension from which a financial crisis 
could emerge is visible at this time, with the 
exception of maybe italy. The eurozone has 
also become stronger.
New, worrisome signs
There is, however, an old-yet-new element, 
a significant negative change in terms of the 
successfulness of known remedies of economic 
policy: a significant change has arisen in the 
public opinion of public policies, the extent 
to which the average citizen agrees with 
the options provided by national economic 
policies, their thoroughly re-evaluated 
protectionist goals and the approach of 
national and international economic processes 
and institutions that is at odds with national 
interests. in the world’s first market economy, 
the uSA, but also, not too long ago, in the 
uK led by Tony Blair at the time – and in the 
conservative party today – it is a commonly 
held view that the market can at the very 
least distribute financial resources efficiently, 
pipelining available financial assets from savers 
to investors. However, the 2008 financial crisis 
– there is no denying this – really did take its 
toll on the faith and confidence in the strength 
of the financial markets, which hadn’t been 
total to begin with. We can also not disregard 
another circumstance: middle-of-the-road 
democratic and Labour governments – which 
had automatically supported the previous 
principle – are no longer in power; furthermore, 
an increasing number of voters have ‘come to 
like’ extremist views: from the far-left to the 
strongly nationalist far-right, policies attacking 
the market and the financial systems in place 
in general have garnered increasing support. 
This is a worrisome development.
even the defining figures of the current, 
fundamentally pro-market American Re-
public party had to come to terms with the 
American government using strongly protec-
tionist measures to try and protect the pre-
sumed or real interests of the country against 
China, Canada and the european union. This 
is done despite scholarly arguments to the 
contrary, since the defining American inter-
national school of economics accepted over a 
century and a half ago the basic international 
trading tenet that international trade creates 
net prosperity (i.e. the overall accounting in 
terms of consumer and producer surplus and 
government revenue – all partners considered, 
including at the level of the world economy 
– is measurably positive). it is true, however, 
that the trading benefits obtained are not 
distributed evenly.19 Now, many politicians 
no longer accept this classical economic ar-
gument pointing to a strongly stimulant ef-
fect leading to prosperity. What’s more, the 
American president, Donald Trump and his 
administration are attempting to present the 
benefits arising from international trade as a 
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zero-sum game where one side’s gain is also 
the other side’s loss. This has become the of-
ficial doctrine of the White House. However, 
this simplifying stance is barely tenable and is 
difficult for science to accept, since trade isn’t 
a process analogous with zero-sum games (one 
side’s gain cannot clearly be identified with 
another side’s loss). 
The uSA has unilaterally imposed tariffs in 
a series of industries it deemed sensitive, espe-
cially as regards steel and aluminum industry 
products. But it imposed unfriendly, protec-
tionist tariffs not only on the large emerging 
economy of the Far east, but also on old trad-
ing partners (Canada, eu). in terms of value 
and strategic value, the latter are less cutting 
and do not yet threaten the outbreak of a 
trade war. At the same time, they significantly 
limit extensive, mutually beneficial trade rela-
tionships, even if the White House is present-
ing these as the ‘nation’s’ economic interests. 
efforts to create a new international trading 
world order – where we can see peculiar ver-
sions of asserting American interests – in most 
cases go counter to scientific consensus: to 
wit, imposing tariffs on mass-produced prod-
ucts manufactured with tried and tested tech-
nologies demonstrably decreases prosperity 
– in the strictly microeconomic sense of the 
term.20 While this isn’t trivial to grasp quan-
titatively, but the end result and its direction 
remain unchanged: tariffs decrease the degree 
of prosperity that can be achieved in a trading 
partnership where one party might be consid-
erably more developed than the other. it can 
also readily be accepted that increasing tariffs 
in Chinese-American relations has a negative 
impact. But protectionist buzzwords and the 
idea of defending the national economy had a 
strong effect on voters in both the uSA and in 
the uK in 2016 at the time of the Brexit ref-
erendum. This effect was non-negligible, just 
like the alarming spread of the idea of ‘illiberal 
capitalism’ (for more on this, see the exhaus-
tive arguments of Csaba, 2018). Fortunately, 
at the G20 summit in december 2018, threats 
of tariff wars had subsided considerably.
A worrisome and statistically substanti-
ated fact, however, did confirm the concerns 
connected to the lack of the usual dynam-
ics in international trade that had typified 
the previous half century: indeed, following 
the 2008–2009 crisis, looking at the average 
growth rate of the world GdP compared to 
the growth rate of world trade, one could ob-
serve that the annual growth of international 
trade could no longer sustainably outstrip the 
annual rate of GdP growth. Therefore, it is 
true that a trend that had been prevalent in 
the six decades following WWii was broken. 
The loss of dynamism in the growth of in-
ternational trade seemed to have been slated 
to occur even without tariffs. However, the 
mechanisms describing and explaining these 
mechanisms aren’t entirely clear yet and have 
yet to be submitted to precise scholarly analy-
sis. But one thing can be stated for sure: pub-
lic opinion in developed countries has grown 
increasingly hostile to globalization and for-
eign economic influence. What’s more, there 
has been a perceptible change of tone and a 
mentality strongly prioritizing national in-
terests has become prevalent. Globalization 
seems to be experiencing repeated backswings, 
the exclusivity of national interests and a gen-
eral protectionist economic policy or one that 
opposes free trade in important industries 
gaining support are causes for concern. if this 
trend becomes lasting in developed industrial-
ized countries – or, more precisely, in devel-
oped ‘service-based’ countries like the uSA 
where more than 70 per cent of the GdP is 
provided by the service sector – well, that car-
ries with it some serious dangers. 
The crux of the danger can be described 
thus.
in a new global economic shock like the 
2008–2009 crisis, the international financial 
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solidarity and the strong international coop-
eration, required for recovery, that had charac-
terized the easing of the tensions born out of 
the mortgage crisis and the immediate com-
pliance with requests for help by the countries 
affected may not be possible in view of current 
conflicts and public opinion. Yet recovering 
from the crisis was absolutely contingent on 
recognizing that international cooperation by 
developed countries acting together financial-
ly and following common interests to attempt 
to stimulate and boost the global recovery 
process was a necessity. 
Accounting for the lessons learnt from the 
crisis ten years ago, it is worthwhile to yet 
again recall and consider the retrospective 
message of the historian referenced previously, 
Tooze, that he intended for the present. in the 
final passages of his book (tooze, 2018), he 
compared the current state of affairs to the sit-
uation in 1914. The way he puts it: back then, 
the world sleepwalked into the conflict of the 
world war. tooze makes a cautious, but all the 
more convincing case that the interwar period 
is a dangerous parallel for understanding to-
day’s situation, insofar as following the armi-
stice of WWi, the tensions that had triggered 
the war were not resolved, only throttled, 
which resulted in them reigniting after two 
decades. At the time, like today, international 
tensions did not fundamentally manifest as 
economic conflicts of interest. These could be 
regarded as secondary. But slogans and politi-
cal distortion intimate some dangerous simi-
larities to the present. He elaborates by stating 
that in a reassuring conflict resolution follow-
ing WWii, the changes effectively required a 
new economic world order. The order born in 
Bretton Woods stays with us to this day, hav-
ing lent overall stability to the world economy, 
which – it is true – can be characterized by the 
dominance of developed industrialized states, 
the uSA and victorious Western powers. At 
the same time, it considered rules-based op-
erations one of its basic tenets, at least as far 
as contentious issues in international financial 
trading processes were concerned. it is of this 
rules-based operation that the WtO (World 
trade Organization), the iMF (international 
Monetary Fund) and the central banks of 
leading industrialized powers became the key 
institutions. Of these institutions – especially 
as a result of American tariff measures and 
the immediate countermeasures to them – 
the WtO seems to be the institutions that is 
weakening the most today, at least as far as 
the odds of rules-based resolutions – within 
the WtO framework – in case of conflict are 
concerned. The other institutions seem to be 
standing on solid foundations and are func-
tioning well. More than that, due to their suc-
cessful operating principles, goals and struc-
ture, they have found real competitors, for 
instance the Asian Bank for Reconstruction 
and development (ABRd), which intends to 
operate with goals and constructions similar 
to the well-known Washington-based institu-
tion of the ‘old economic world order’ (the 
iBRd).
SUmmAry – ConClUSionS
ten years after the crisis, we may be able 
to provide a more deliberate and accurate 
analysis of events. What have we been 
able to learn if we take a step back? Many 
questions have been clarified, although 
reassuring answers cannot be provided to all 
of the questions that have arisen. The loss 
of output in the course of the 2008–2009 
world economic crisis was significant in the 
most developed countries, including both 
the uSA and europe. An important new 
element is that the countries with significant 
downturns included not only those where 
the rapid loss of confidence was accompanied 
by a banking crisis, but also many developed 
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countries (e.g. the uK, Canada), where 
the stability of the financial system hadn’t 
otherwise been damaged. While both the 
uSA and the eu have made up for the loss 
of output, significantly exceeding pre-crisis 
output levels (by 4 to 8 per cent), negative 
side effects of the crisis remain, resulting in 
a large-scale slowdown and delay of new, 
productive investments (i.e. those where the 
investment doesn’t take the shape of portfolio 
swaps translating to a reorganization of 
financial assets). in addition, another 
negative trend has emerged, which at this 
time is still relatively difficult to interpret, 
but which appears lasting, which is the 
slowdown of productivity (Y/L – output 
over labor input) and of so-called tFP (total 
Factor Productivity) (in practical terms, this 
is the output-growth effect of technological 
progress). While this slowdown appears 
clearly in statistics, macroeconomics has yet 
to provide a satisfying explanation for it. 
As a positive development from the point 
of view of macroeconomics, the general crisis 
management process, which saw the political 
force and legitimacy of so-called discretionary 
fiscal policies confirmed in the most devel-
oped countries affected by the crisis, can be 
viewed as an acknowledgment of previously 
exposed tenets (Blanchard, Summers, 2017). 
The main point of successful crisis manage-
ment practices is that they strengthen the le-
gitimacy of anticyclical intervention, i.e. the 
need for the state to spend more in a time 
of contraction and loss of output, thereby 
boosting an overall demand that is lagging 
behind. At the same time – and this is an-
other rule that needs to be observed strictly 
– in times of prosperity, when the economy 
has recovered to normal levels of growth and 
can thus generate more revenue (taxes) for 
the government, public spending needs to be 
reined in and accumulated new debts need to 
start being reduced. The latter is a far more 
difficult operation, because following a pe-
riod of financial abundance for the state and 
the central bank, it’s more difficult to have 
voters accept budgetary austerity on the sole 
grounds that this is the correct way to handle 
a crisis fiscally.21 A strong scientific confirma-
tion of this observation is provided by high-
level star authors of macroeconomics, includ-
ing Blinder (2013), Blanchard and Summers, 
(2017) along with Furman (2018).
Another lasting and global lesson to be 
drawn from the handling of the world eco-
nomic crisis is that the merging of interna-
tional economic cycles has presumably be-
come a lasting characteristic of interventions 
easing/preventing output losses. There is no 
disregarding the fact that the significant pub-
lic spending and lending stimulus in the Chi-
nese economy between 2008 and 2011 pro-
vided significant assistance in maintaining the 
international economic cycle and world econ-
omy at a certain level. As has been ascertained 
by the experts of the international Monetary 
Fund with proper objectivity (iMF, 2014), the 
Chinese stimulus arrived just in time to re-
duce the loss of output. during the difficult 
years of the crisis (2008–2011), the iMF it-
self paid out a total of SdR 420 billion, or 
roughly uSd 620 billion to member states, of 
which roughly one third was used specifically 
for damage mitigation, for immediate short-
term relief. An important new development is 
that strengthening banking regulations (mak-
ing them stricter) enabled stabilizing a bank-
ing system that had grown unstable.
Overall, the most recent world economic 
crisis proved a previous public financial tenet 
in that a more favorable fiscal situation (equi-
librium) resulted in a more favorable crisis 
process, guaranteeing a smaller contraction 
and loss of output. it can also be said with a 
high degree of probability that in the future, 
the rule books of public financial bailouts will 
contain entirely different and stricter terms 
 StudieS 
Public Finance Quarterly  2019/1 107
and conditions when it comes to distributing 
bailouts and that private institutions would 
not be entitled to receiving immediate assis-
tance.
While in the winter of 2018–2019, in a sit-
uation antithetical to international economic 
cooperation, there is a fair amount of danger, 
there is still no certainty as to when the next 
world economic shock will occur nor an es-
timate of how big of a quake it will be. The 
future is not predictable, especially so in the 
world economy. But preventive mechanisms 
must be on stand-by so that they can be ap-
plied immediately if necessary. 
Notes
1 The author is thankful for the anonymous remarks 
and suggestions concerning the original manuscript 
and has taken them into consideration.
2 Bernanke, B. S. (2017; 164)
3 For a more detailed discussion of this, see: Csaba 
(2009), Mellár (2015), Summers (2016), Bernanke 
(2017), and Jacobs and Mazzucato (2018).
4 Acta Oeconomica Vol 68, Special issue 2, 2018
5 A series of potentially best-selling works were 
born, such as Ross Sorkin’s book called too Big 
to Fail (also made into a movie) or Michael Lewis’ 
The Big Short, which was turned into an Oscar-
winning movie, or another Oscar-winning movie, 
inside Job, which exposed the ‘sinful’ measures 
taken by American financial service providers in 
the manner of a documentary. At the same time, 
a play about the history of the Lehman Brothers 
banking house discussing the events of the 2008–
2009 crisis premiered at the London National 
Theatre, and it would play to a full house for years 
to come.
6 For a more detailed discussion of this, see: Kelton 
(2018).
7 Bernanke, B. S. op.cit. 163
8 Bernanke, B. S. op.cit. 163
9 For a more detailed discussion of this, see Magas 
(2009).
10 Bernanke, B.S. op.cit. 164
11 Bernanke, B.S. op.cit. 164
12 CBO (2018). The Budget and economic Outlo-
ok 2018 to 2028. April 9, 2018 https://www.cbo.
gov/system/files?file=115th-congress-2017-2018/
reports/53651-outlook.pdf 
13 WeO, October 2018: https://blogs.imf.org/2018/ 
10/03/lasting-effects-the-global-economic-recovery-
10-years-after-the-crisis 
14 This is confirmed by Griffith-Jones, S., Cozzi, G.: 
investment-led growth: a solution to the europe-
an crisis. in: Jacobs, Mazzucato (ed.), (2018). pp. 
205–228
15 For a great overview of these: Blinder (2013), Mellár 
(2015) and Stiglitz (2017).
16 For an excellent summary of these: Furman (2018) 
and modern monetary theory in light of economic 
policy [Wray, Nersisyan (2018), pp. 83–114].
17 For a detailed discussion of this, see: Bod (2018) 
who provides an exhaustive analysis of the changes 
in the international financial environment along 
with Kollarik, Szalai (2017).
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